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In the 1990’s, the CFSP and its military component the ESDP have become core elements of the French defense doctrine. Whereas the Gaullist doctrine in the 1960’s put the emphasis on sovereignty and independence as the best ways to maintain the French position in international politics, the European political unification being a complementary option, the new strategy is much more aware of the necessity to act within a European framework. In 1994, the building of a European defense policy is quoted in the Livre blanc on defense as one of the French priorities, which is quite a new idea. Two decades earlier, the 1972 Livre blanc on national defense did not even mention the possibility of creating a European defense. ni
Since 1997, the organization of the French army and the definition of its missions have been modified in a way which is coherent with the CFSP/ESDP developing process​[2]​. After the entry into force of the military reform agreed on 1996-97, the French army is better equipped to project forces out of the territory and to contribute –through ESDP operations- to the Petersberg tasks (art.17 UE). This should be even truer at the end of the current military program (2003-2008) launched in January 27, 2003. This program is part of a long-term modernization program which deadline is fixed in 2015 (“modèle d’armée 2015”). 

If the French strategy puts the emphasis on the European defense policy, NATO and the UN are not neglected. After the military intervention in Iraq, they are considered as the necessary basis of a stable international system. The UN is crucial to legitimate peacekeeping and other crisis management operations. NATO is crucial to ensure that EU/US relationship is built on negotiation and cooperation. NATO can also be a useful framework for crisis management whenever the Europeans and the Americans want to achieve a common goal and because ESDP lacks some crucial military tools which are available in NATO. But the EU must try to be autonomous, i.e. must have the capacity to decide and act alone each time it is deemed necessary. 

The importance given by the new strategy to (international and) European matters does not mean that France has got rid of its Gaullist tradition of independence and sovereignty. Actually, French policymakers try to conciliate this tradition with the necessity of being embedded in collective frameworks. They want their country to be a leader in a strong –mostly intergovernmental- ESDP, which should allow the EU to act in an autonomous way in international politics, be it inside or outside NATO. 


France as a leader of an intergovernmental ESDP

The French vision of ESDP

France wants the European Union to be a political and military actor capable of influencing world affairs. The EU, which is already a civilian actor, must transform into a military one in order to be a global actor, with a strong external policy in economic as well as political and military fields. 
With the building of the ESDP, the EU now has some capabilities in crisis management​[3]​. Seven operations have been launched by the EU within the framework of ESDP. France chose a high profile contribution, sending a lot of its soldiers to these countries where a European presence was requested.   French officials have repeatedly said that these operations –though limited in their scope and intensity- are of great importance because they can be considered as a first step in the creation of a strong European defense policy. But in the future, the EU must be able to lead a more ambitious military operation, including combat forces. 

From a French point of view, the development of ESDP should be accelerated. But federalism is not the proper method. The French defend a cautious intergovernmental position as far as ESDP institutions are concerned. Leadership should be provided by the most powerful Member states on a consensual basis and Qualified Majority Voting should not become the current way of taking decisions. 

Even if this position is close to the British one, France presented its proposals on the constitutionnalization of ESDP together with Germany, first in November 2002​[4]​, secondly in January 2003. 
According to the Franco-German declarations, the defense ministers would be better involved in the setting up of ESDP thanks to an enlargement of the Council composition (idea of an “external relations and defense” Council). The Political and Security Committee would fully play its role, provided that it does not directly participate in the decision-making. The political decision would continue to be taken by political leaders within the Council. The High representative, created by the Amsterdam Treaty on the basis of a French proposal which ought to give the European Union a “face” and a “voice”, would become the future European foreign minister, would assume the chairmanship of the “external relations and defense” meetings of the Council, and would give incentives to the European defense policy -as well as the Commission (whom he will belong to)- by using a formal right of proposal in CFSP/ESDP matters. But the Member states would continue to play the core role. French propositions for the future of ESDP do not deeply change the ESDP institutional mechanism. 
The most audacious propositions –especially the extension of QMV inside CFSP/ESDP- are due to the German influence and are the result of the necessity to find compromise with the German special partner. But QMV is feared by the French, as well as every proposition giving more power to supranational bodies. QMV should not be applied in ESDP matters. Besides, the democratic control of the High representative by the European Parliament is not welcome: transparency is clearly a secondary goal, far behind the search for efficiency. This is a difference between France and Germany and clearly a common goal of both the French and the British.

In addition to the strengthening of intergovernmental structures, the French priority is to facilitate the emergence of coalitions of the willing within ESDP framework, by developing the flexibility method. Does it mean that a permanent group of states should deal with military issues whereas the others would stay apart? This was not the position supported by France inside the Convention on the future of Europe. But in the context of the crisis over Iraq and after the accession of ten new European members, the idea of a core group assuming more responsibilities than the others in military matters –at least in the middle term- has gained some credit. While participating in the April 29, 2003 summit together with Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, France wanted to make clear that the future of the European defense depended on the political will of a few key Member states. But the idea lying behind this meeting was not to create a two-speed CFSP, with the French assuming the leadership of a small “ESDP group”. For France, a core group would not be of any help for the development of ESDP if the UK is not part of it. The framework of the “permanent structure for cooperation”, which was finally included in the constitutional treaty, will only be successful if the UK gives an active contribution. The Battle Group concept, a French proposal aimed at increasing the EU rapid reaction capacity, will give the opportunity to the British to be highly involved in these “permanent structure for cooperation”. 

Actually, France put the emphasis on military capabilities more than on ESDP institutions. The priority is to ensure that ESDP is capable of acting in crisis management, not to build sophisticated institutional mechanisms.  

The French contribution within ESDP

The French participation in the strengthening of ESDP is huge. France has made a big contribution in terms of institution building -the High Representative, for instance, derives from the French proposal of a “Mr or Mrs CFSP”- and is the biggest provider of military forces. France is also the most active country as far as military operations are concerned. 
This high-profile contribution is not surprising, considering the political motivations that lie behind French proposals and actions. Actually, CFSP/ESDP is perceived as a means to exert influence in international relations as taking the lead of a powerful Europe. France is no longer a big international power but could be powerful enough to be a leader –a leader among others- inside ESDP. As it is stated in the 1994 Livre blanc, « the ability for France to keep its position in world affairs is to a large extent linked with its capacity to influence the construction of Europe»​[5]​.

France has the capacity to be an active contributor to CFSP/ESDP but it is doubtful whether it has the capacity to exert leadership. The French contribution to the catalogue of forces may be important, but it does not give enough capability to allow the European Union to act alone –i.e. without the support of the United States- for most of the crisis management operations. The changes in terms of forces, armament, equipment and staff have not been sufficient. The defense budget remains at a low level and is mostly spent on staff costs when the emphasis should be put on equipment, military research or technologies​[6]​. 

Moreover, the international ambitions of France can be detrimental to its relations with the EU member states, especially on CFSP/ESDP matters. Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the image of France is one of a country in search of power and independence, and willing to play an international role far beyond its effective capabilities. Most of the European member states reject a French leadership of CFSP and ESDP. 
The European countries doubt the sincerity of French officials when they talk about ESDP. France is perceived as a country using European political unification in order to pursue its own ambition of power. France is often accused of being arrogant and selfish. This has been the case during the crisis over Iraq​[7]​. 

The French policymakers have to convince every Member states, first that they are sincere when they talk about European defense, secondly that ESDP will profit everybody not only France, thirdly that NATO will not be affected by the building of a European security and defense identity. 
The priority is to find a common position with Germany and the United Kingdom, because of their political weight within the European Union. 

In the mid-1990’s, the Franco-German “couple” disagreed on some issues, but despite these difficulties, they succeeded in making common proposals​[8]​ on defense issues during the intergovernmental conference which led to the adoption of the Amsterdam treaty. In particular, they tried to improve communication between the EU and the WEU, making clear that the EU must be the core organization. In Amsterdam, this conception was enshrined in the revision treaty (see art.17 EU). 
In more recent years, the relationship between France and Germany has been very close, the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée treaty being a symbol of this. During the crisis over Iraq, they cooperated to defend a common position against the war. This political choice was made on the assumption that they had the capacity to unite Europe on this specific issue. But it was perceived as a way to reestablish the Franco-German leadership of the EU and it only brought division and discord.  Since the Blaesheim meeting in January 2001, the French and the Germans have taken the habit to meet several times a year at different level (ministry of foreign affairs, embassies…)
Generally speaking, the Franco-German couple is necessary to European integration but is far from sufficient to ensure that the integration process is still valid​[9]​. Both countries cannot take decisions for the rest of Europe and their initiatives might, to some extent, be counter-productive if they are seen as a means to establish a “directoire” of great powers and as an attempt to oppose the United States and NATO.  

In fact, the success of Franco-German initiatives highly depends upon the position taken by the British government. Whenever Franco-German proposals are accepted by the United Kingdom, European political unification is making progress.  After the adoption of the Amsterdam treaty, French policymakers kept thinking that the European security and defense identity had to be more clearly located at the EU. The United Kingdom had to be convinced of this necessity. This was done at the end of 1998 during the Saint-Malo Franco-British summit. The two countries, in a common statement, insisted on the necessity to deal with European defense issues inside the EU, and to strengthen European military capabilities without harming NATO. This statement paved the way for the ESDP in the same way the Franco-German initiative in 1990 facilitated the institution of CFSP. After Saint-Malo, the military requirements of a credible ESDP have been mostly defined by the British and by the French. The statement made by the two countries in Le Touquet (February 4, 2003) reminded us of the role played by the Franco-British relation in the building of a more credible ESDP. Recently, France and the UK cooperated in order to set up Battle Groups of 1500 soldiers which could be sent in 15 days to cope with an urgent situation in a “failed state”. This concept has been included in the new Headline Goal (HG 2010).  
France and the United Kingdom still have close military cooperation, in spite of their disagreement about the way to deal with the Iraqi regime. Even though the British give priority to their special relationship with the United States, this does not mean that they have decided to stop the development of the ESDP. Now the Franco-British military cooperation must transform into a more political one. This will only be possible provided that the two countries clarify the consequences of ESDP on the transatlantic relationship. 


France in search of a more balanced transatlantic relation 

The French vision of NATO as an alliance of equal partners

From a French viewpoint, the EU must be an autonomous actor both in terms of decision-making and operational capabilities. Autonomy implies a capacity to defend positions which can differ from the American ones and a capacity to act alone whenever a military intervention proves to be necessary. 
However, the purpose of the French foreign policy is not to build the European defense policy in opposition to that of the United States, but to be able to make its own choices.  NATO must be preserved but it must evolve in a way that “allows the European security and defense identity to emerge”. 
Some observers would define the French foreign policy as a policy aimed at creating a gap between Europe and America. This is certainly not true: the role played by the United states in European (and international) security is acknowledged by French political leaders. What is true, however, is that France supports the concept of a multipolar world and wants the EU to be a political counterweight to the United States. When Jacques Chirac was asked, in 2003, why he opposed the war in Iraq, his first answer was: “because we want to leave in a multipolar world”. This statement created resentment in the US and also in Europe, especially in the UK, because the main justification of the French position seemed to be the will to couterweight the US and not the situation in Iraq or international security considerations. 
However, France has been trying to convince the Americans and its EU partners that the preservation of the alliance and good transatlantic relations are considered as priority goals. On several occasions during the 1990’s, France took position in favour of the transformation of NATO and its adaptation to the post-Cold War era (adoption of a new NATO concept, decision to create Combined Joint Task Forces…) France even announced, in December 5, 1995, its decision to participate in the meetings of the military Committee and of the Atlantic Council. This was a historical momentum, because France had retired from the NATO military bodies in 1966, after a decision taken by Charles de Gaulle. Of course, the decision to get closer to the alliance was pragmatic: as French soldiers were involved in NATO crisis management operations (FORPRONU), it was necessary for France to be present in those bodies whose decisions could have an impact on the situation of French military forces. But the decision was also political: it was meant at making the European security and defense identity accepted inside NATO. 
However, the French specificity and the Gaullist tradition have not completely disappeared. De Gaulle already defended the idea of an equal partnership between Europe and the United States​[10]​. In the 1990’s, France accepted to get closer to NATO given that a new equilibrium between Europe and the United States had been reached within the Atlantic organization (thanks to new agreements between the EU and NATO or thanks to a reform of SHAPE). But France’s integration into NATO stopped when the United States refused to give the South-Europe Command to a European officer. The NATO Rapid Reaction Force is welcome, provided that “it develops in a way compatible with the agreements reached by some Members states within the European Union”. “The basic elements of this force should be used by one organization or the other without right of first use”​[11]​. And France would fully participate in the alliance if only “the European defense identity is permanent and visible”​[12]​ and provided that NATO continues to be adapted in a way which allows the European Union to be autonomous in the management of crises. 
This adaptation depends upon both the US partner and the EU member states. The Europeans must have the military resources to be credible as far as crisis management is concerned. If they rely too much upon the US military assets available in NATO, they will not be able to take their own decisions. Of course, EU-US arrangements in NATO can help to clarify the situation. France is very aware of the necessity to ensure that the Europeans should have military control over operations that are led by the Europeans. But whatever institutional and operational arrangements can be, it will not make the EU autonomous if the success of the crisis management operation highly depends upon the military support given by the United States. Officially, Paris says that the EU should avoid unnecessary duplications of NATO assets. But no doubt this is mostly rhetoric. For France, the Europeans should make an effort in key domains (intelligence, command and communication systems, transport) in order to enhance ESDP and make it more effective and credible. This should imply some duplication.
The new equilibrium between Europe and America also depends on the position of the US administration. If the United States do not facilitate the development of a European crisis management within NATO, it will be even more difficult for the EU Member states to reach a consensus on ESDP and its role inside and outside NATO. France has a role to play in making clear that its main goal is not to build a European power in opposition to the US. Yet the EU countries, especially those which are very close to the US, as the UK, must try to convince the US administration that the development of a credible ESDP is the best option for the future of transatlantic relations. 
The international environment, after 9.11 and above all after the crisis over Iraq, does not seem favorable to the realization of the French vision of a balanced transatlantic relation. Is the idea of an equal partnership still realistic in such a context? 


2.2 The French position on transatlantic relations after 9.11 and the crisis over Iraq

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, France gave strong support to the United States. Jacques Chirac was the first European leader to go to New York after the terrorist attacks and he strongly supported military action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan​[13]​. 
But when Georges W. Bush pronounced his State of the Union address on January 29th, 2002, denouncing an “axis of evil” that included Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the French officials started to criticize the American foreign policy choices. Their fears were confirmed a few months later, when Georges W. Bush articulated the doctrine of preemptive war in a speech in West Point, in June 2002​[14]​, and in September of the same year, when this doctrine was given official status in the National Security Strategy.
When Georges W. Bush decided to overthrow the Iraqi regime, France considered that the risks of an invasion could outweigh the benefits. It was not a “pacifist” stance: in January 2003, France was making plans for a possible participation in an intervention in Iraq​[15]​. It was not only a debate about how to deal with Iraq but also a debate about international order and the role played by the United States. 
France does not want to give the United States a blank check for the management of world affairs. Its support would depend on the kind of policy the U.S. government would define. The fact that the U.S. is the sole superpower is not enough to accept American leadership. 
For the Americans and some of France’s European allies, especially the British, the main driver of the French policy was to challenge American hegemony. This is not totally true, but the way French policymakers behaved during the crisis explains this misunderstanding. The style of Jacques Chirac and his foreign affairs minister Dominique de Villepin made the clash worse than it could have been. 

The crisis over Iraq caused an erosion of trust among American and French leaders. For America, the world has changed in September 2001. For France, what has changed is America. Whichever is true, France and America participated in a diplomatic disagreement that provoked the worst transatlantic crisis since the creation of NATO. 
However, the partnership between Europe and America remains a necessity. Americans and Europeans identified very similar issues as their primarily concerns of foreign policy, particularly international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Of course, the method used by the Europeans and the Americans to solve these problems is different, the latter being more inclined to military action and unilateralism, and the former giving priority to political instruments and multilateralism. But to cope with international security problems, the United States should certainly give more credit to civilian and diplomatic aspects of its strategy whereas, in the future, the EU, backed up by a strong ESDP, should be more and more involved in peacekeeping and crisis management, both militarily and diplomatically. This is what France is expecting. 
From 1998 to 2001, the international context seemed to be in favour of a rise of European power (thanks to the building of a credible ESDP) and a more balanced transatlantic relation. Since 2001, it seems to show a gap between the EU and the US. But now that the crisis over Iraq has lessened, the context should make another change in a way that could be favourable to the alliance. The problems that the Bush administration is facing in dealing with post-war Iraq may lead the United States to a more multilateral approach of foreign relations. Even a country as powerful as the United States cannot continue to take decisions without having a minimum level of legitimacy and consent. In their recent trip in Europe, Georges Bush and Condoleeza Rice have given signs of their willingness to take the European views into consideration. While maintaining its neo-conservative strategy, the US has made tactical adjustments which show a readiness to get closer to the Europeans, and especially the French. On its side, France certainly has to play its role in the reconciliation. If relations between France and the United States do not improve, Washington will continue to seek support from individual European states and a balanced EU/US partnership will not emerge. So the French diplomatic aims should be: first, to reach a consensus with its European partners on transatlantic relations; secondly, to search for compromise with the US in order to create a virtuous circle of cooperation and trustful relations. 
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